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FALL OF MANILA OPENS WAY TO CHINA COAST

THE entrance of American troops into Manila on February 3—less than a week after the first American motor convoy crossed the China border along the newly opened road from India—turns the clock back to the early days of the Pacific War. It was at the beginning of January 1942 that Manila fell to the Japanese, and within a few months the Burma Road was also cut. For almost three years the Philippines have suffered under Japanese rule, while China has been dependent upon air transport for virtually all the foreign supplies it has been able to secure. But today the Philippines are well on the way toward liberation, and the first break has been made in the Japanese blockade of China.

CHINA'S SUPPLY PROSPECTS. These events, which are so fraught with emotional significance—especially the release of Allied prisoners held by the Japanese—are also of prime military importance, for they lay the basis for strengthening China's war effort and landing American troops on the China coast or Formosa. The first convoy on the Ledo Road, renamed the Stilwell Road by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, was six miles long and included jeeps, ambulances, medium and light artillery, as well as trucks loaded with ammunition and other supplies, totaling hundreds of tons.

Undoubtedly China's supply prospects are brighter than at any time in the past four years, particularly since domestic production of war materials may be expected to increase. In fact, as Donald M. Nelson pointed out in a report published on January 26, steps are being taken to raise China's total war output by the spring of this year to double the rate of last November. The favorable aspects of the situation should not be exaggerated, however, for imports and home production combined will fall far short of China's needs. Not until a port is opened somewhere along the coast will it be possible to make large quantities of supplies available. Unfortunately the

Japanese are doing their utmost to build up strength against American landing forces. This is the meaning of the current drives in southeastern China, as a result of which Japan has taken the rest of the Canton-Hankow railway and is also threatening certain advance airfields which remained in American hands after the Chinese retreats last year.

In the face of these developments, and the experiences of 1944, Chungking is taking steps to reorganize its armies. According to an announcement of February 1, about a third of all military personnel will be dismissed, many superfluous military organizations abolished, and sharp increases made in the pay of officers and men. It may seem peculiar for a country to cut down its armies in the midst of war, but Chungking has actually had many more soldiers than could be properly equipped or cared for under current conditions. Dismissing part of the personnel will enable the government to allot more money for the remaining forces.

U.S. AID TO GUERRILLAS. There are clear-cut indications that the United States Army is looking forward to cooperating with China's guerrilla forces, as well as with the Central troops. One sign of the times is to be found in the fact that almost ten tons of American Red Cross materials—consisting of sulfa drugs, microscopes, X-ray equipment, surgical instruments and other medical supplies—have been flown to the Communist capital at Yenan by the China Wing of the Air Transport Command. This represents a significant break in the Central blockade of the Communist areas, and it is encouraging to note that it occurred with Chungking's aid. The delivery of these materials may be connected with the highly favorable report on medical activities in the Northwest submitted by Major Melvin A. Casberg, a doctor attached to the American military mission which has been in Communist China since last summer.

The guerrilla troops of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies are undoubtedly anxious to work with the United States Army. There is reason, for example, to believe recent Japanese radio reports that the guerrillas have been constructing secret airfields in anticipation of their later use by American planes. In fact, General Chu Teh, commander-in-chief of Yen-an's forces, has specifically mentioned the building of landing fields as one of the ways in which his armies could cooperate with the Allies against Japan. Other forms of aid suggested by General Chu are: provisioning Allied submarines from sections of coast controlled by the guerrillas, supplying intelligence about the enemy, extending help in the rescue of Allied aviators, and "disturbing the enemy in Central and North China while he is fighting the Allies in southeast Asia."

UNSETTLED POLITICS. Meanwhile, the political problem of Chungking-Communist relations remains to be settled. The most recent development in this connection occurred on January 24, when Chou En-lai, Communist representative in the national capital, returned there from Yen-an. In an interview given before he left the Northwest, Chou declared

that his object was to propose to the government, the Kuomintang, and various lesser political groups organized in the Federation of Chinese Democratic Parties that a preparatory meeting of all parties and groups be held to lay the basis for a National Affairs Conference and a coalition government.

Well-established American policies toward China were reiterated by Under Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew on January 23 when he declared that the consummation of a Kuomintang-Communist agreement "would be very gratifying. . . . We earnestly desire the development of a strong and united China." Mr. Grew added that "this government has been lending its best efforts to be of service in appropriate ways, such as through the exercise of friendly good offices when requested by the Chinese." Whether anything will come of these efforts it is impossible to say. Without question it is highly desirable that when American forces land in China they enter a united country in which there will be no question as to the governmental authorities with whom they must deal in any particular area.

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

U.S. FOLLOWS SHORTSIGHTED ECONOMIC POLICY TOWARD FRANCE

Although the location and agenda of the Big Three Conference remain heavily guarded secrets, President Roosevelt is believed to have gone to this important meeting determined to fulfill the promise, stated in his Message to Congress on January 6: that the United States will use its influence to secure for liberated peoples the right to a free choice of their government and institutions. In implementing this policy the President will undoubtedly find that American economic power constitutes his strongest single weapon. With it, the United States may bring pressure on Britain and Russia to readjust, in accordance with democratic principles, their plans for those countries of special strategic importance to them. With it, the United States could also help prevent the growth in the liberated countries of the misery and despair that have all too often in the past given birth to totalitarian régimes. In the light of this opportunity, it is disheartening that so little American economic assistance has thus far been extended to France as it attempts to solve the economic problems that threaten to produce a political explosion.

FRANCE PUZZLED BY LACK OF AID. To Frenchmen who enthusiastically received the American armies last summer as they raced up the Rhone Valley or fought their way across Normandy, United States failure to follow up this display of armed power with a program of much-needed economic aid for France is as perplexing as it is disappointing. This does not mean that the French have not received American supplies, particularly of a military nature. The United States has equipped 80 French

air force units, 8 divisions of the army, and agreed to supply 8 more. These supplies are regarded by the French as of great importance not only because they help them fight for victory but because they speed the resurrection of national power, an achievement on which the French lay great emphasis. In addition, the French civilian population will undoubtedly benefit greatly from the reconstruction work done by Americans, for military reasons, on transport and port facilities. And, finally, the United States Army has brought in 175,000 tons of civilian relief supplies consisting of food, soap and some clothing, but this amount was merely of token size for so large a population.

France's greatest need is for basic raw materials, a few key machine parts and civilian transport, since these supplies would give French industries the boost they require to set them in motion again. This need has not been met and, as a result, the French are unable to make the wartime economic contribution they believe they could otherwise be making. For, contrary to predictions made before D-Day, their industrial equipment has emerged largely intact from the German retreat and the Allied invasion. However, without outside help the entire French economy has come perilously close to collapse. Shutdowns in French industrial plants affect 2,500,000 to 3,000,000 workers—an enormous group in a nation that numbers approximately 35,000,000 when prisoners of war and drafted laborers in Germany are subtracted from the total national population. Moreover, for lack of transport to move food supplies from agricultural to

urban regions, French cities are on the verge of starvation, food riots have recently taken place in Lyon and Toulouse, and labor troubles traceable to lack of food and employment have become frequent. Under these circumstances, the question inevitably arises: how can France move toward the establishment of a popularly elected government and regain its national strength if the country is torn by economic and social unrest?

HELP TO FRANCE POSTPONED. Last month it seemed that obstacles which had prevented the adoption of a broad program of American economic aid for France had been overcome. On January 15 the United States announced an export agreement with the French whereby, during each succeeding three-month period, space equivalent to that of 26 Liberty ships, or approximately 260,000 tons, would be assigned for shipping to France rehabilitation equipment and raw materials for essential industries. This tonnage represented only a fraction of the French request for 1,000,000 tons a month, but appeared sufficient to satisfy at least the most pressing of France's civilian needs. In addition, the United States adopted measures that would help solve the serious unemployment problem in France. According to this plan, developed at the request of American production authorities who face acute manpower shortages at home, as well as the French government, the United States Army was to obtain more than a billion dollars' worth of critical goods from resuscitated French industrial plants in 1945.

Now, however, it appears that these plans for sending prompt American aid to the French civilian population are being severely curtailed. In January, the French expected to receive 6 of the 26 ships scheduled for their use during the first three-month period, but they have received none to date. During February it is probable that 10 ships will arrive in French harbors. The remaining shipping space promised the French is apparently "on order" but subject to change. In effect, therefore, the United States program for economic assistance to France has been postponed.

For a survey of the French situation, read:

STRUGGLE FOR A NEW FRANCE

by Winifred N. Hadsel

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MUST RELIEF AWAIT VICTORY? Of such major importance to the United States is the critical economic situation in France that Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew broadcast a report on the problem of supplying the French civilian population on February 2, and the Office of War Information released a similar statement on the subject on February 4. Both Mr. Grew and the OWI explained that the United States wants to do everything possible to aid France, that it has already done a great deal, and that it is determined to do more in the future. They declared, however, that at the moment the United States is temporarily blocked in its efforts to extend greater assistance because of the priority of military requirements both in Europe and the Far East. In short, the official position of the United States is that much of the program for aiding France must wait until victory over Germany is won.

That military necessities must come first is a strong argument, perhaps the strongest that can be advanced at a moment when great battles are in their decisive stages. Moreover, it is clear that France's greatest hope for future economic and political stability lies in the achievement of a speedy military decision. What is disturbing is the possibility that the value of Allied victory over Germany may be gravely impaired if we concentrate on winning it to such an extent that we neglect to help the French and the other liberated peoples tackle their civilian problems so that civil war may be avoided. It is not, after all, only in war that there is danger that action may be "too little and too late." During the current period of national recuperation in France some of the main lines of future political and economic patterns are inevitably being drawn. It is in the midst of war, therefore, as well as in the more remote post-war period that we must use our economic power to help the French maintain conditions necessary for the establishment of those freely chosen institutions President Roosevelt has promised them and other liberated nations. Otherwise we may attain our immediate objective of defeating the Nazis and fail to gain our long-range goal of advancing American security by maintaining the friendship of France and other European nations.

WINIFRED N. HADSEL

We Stood Alone, by Dorothy Adams. New York, Longmans, Green, 1944. \$3.00


An American girl, who went to Europe to study and married into a Polish family, writes so charmingly and with such love for the people and country that even those whose views differ will feel an understanding sympathy.

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Washington News Letter



WILL ALLIES ACHIEVE COMMON POLICY ON WAR CRIMINALS?

The Allies twice have recognized that they have a common interest in the punishment to be accorded war criminals. The first occasion was on October 21, 1943, when they established in London the United Nations Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes; the second, on November 1, 1943, when President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshall Stalin signed a declaration promising that the "major" war criminals would "be punished by the joint decision of the governments of the allies." Yet in practice the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States have approached the problem of war criminals independently. They have declined to take advantage of an excellent opportunity to practice international cooperation.

WEAKNESSES OF WAR CRIMES COMMISSION. Many factors have weakened the War Crimes Commission. The Soviet Union has never participated in its work. "We ourselves will judge our torturers and this we will entrust to nobody," Ilya Ehrenburg, well-known Russian journalist, was quoted by the Moscow radio on January 15. The Commission has had only the powers of an international study group, whose proposals both Britain and the United States have ignored. The two outstanding representatives on the Commission, Sir Cecil Hurst, of Britain, and Herbert C. Pell, of the United States, sought to turn it into a plenary agency, but their respective governments discouraged these efforts. Sir Cecil resigned, and on January 26 Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew said that Mr. Pell was not returning to the Commission as Congress had failed to appropriate funds to pay the expenses of his office.

The reluctance of the powers to put their faith in international commissions is almost as disheartening as the fact that disagreement about the treatment of war criminals continues to exist even after German territory has been invaded both on the east and west by Allied armies, a portent of the enemy's fall. The powers disagree on the criterion for deciding who is a war criminal; on whether the Nazis who have committed crimes against more than one country should be tried by international judicial courts or military courts; whether the most important Nazis should be dealt with by a different process than their underlings; and whether important Nazis, if they are separated from the others, should be hailed before some

special court or disposed of by political judgment. The British consider that the Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin statement calls for a political judgment, but the United States and Russia lean toward a trial.

PUNISHMENT FOR TOP NAZIS CERTAIN. Public apprehension over disclosures of the weakness of the War Crimes Commission has forced Britain and the United States to strengthen their separate policies with respect to war criminals. The governments of both countries have now accepted Pell's formula that "war criminals" include those guilty of persecuting their fellow-nationals—a device aimed at punishing Germans, Hungarians and others who harrassed Jews in their own countries. Richard Law, Minister of State, announced this policy for Britain in the House of Commons on February 1, and Acting Secretary Grew announced it for the United States at a press conference on February 2. Mr. Law's statement, however, was open to the interpretation that the Germans themselves might try their compatriot anti-Semites, which meets with little approval here.

The Allies will endanger their relations with one another and play into the hands of the defeated enemy unless they determine to reach a common agreement on details of the war criminals issue. The United States government is sincere in its protestations that it will expect war criminals to pay for their crimes, and the determination of the Soviet government on this score is perhaps the best assurance that Hitler will not be sent to some St. Helena. The best policy will be served if the public, instead of urging full disclosures now of United States policy on war criminals, presses for international agreement on policy. The United States and Britain might endanger prisoners of war held by Germany if the two countries should announce before German surrender specific programs for settling accounts with designated war criminals. Germany has already mistreated prisoners from other countries in reprisal. Thus on December 6, 1944 the Sofia radio announced that the Bulgarian Red Cross had accused the Germans of amputating the hand of a captured Bulgarian officer and the index fingers of two Bulgarian privates, while the Soviet Embassy in Washington reported in its *Bulletin* of February 2 that the Nazis had killed 165,000 Soviet prisoners of war during the German occupation of Lithuania.

BLAIR BOLLES

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